When will the world say enough is enough to Saudi Arabia?

For too long I have expressed the view that the main source of radicalism in the Islamic faith begins and ends in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.  The petrol money has been used to fuel this radicalism. This is not rocket science and yet for too long our government has looked the other way.  We all know the interest of oil money and oil companies trumps everything else but that has to stop. To be able to win the "war on terror" we have to deal with the religious ideology/theology that is coming out of Mecca. The Wahhabi brand of Islam is about as radical and backward as it gets. The Koran like any other religious text is open to interpretation - whether the fanatics acknowledge that fact or not. Why couldn't the branch of Sufi Islam be mainstream? The branch that can co-exist with modernity - and other religions - and other interpretations - and co-exist with secular society and government? Those ingredients are essential to ensure greater harmony and advancement in a society. Wahhabi Islam is a relic of the 7th century and it should be condemned, shunned and rejected. Instead,  we have closed our eyes to the abuses in Saudi Arabia perpetrated against their own people - women, gays and other religious sects. We have ignored the funding of extremism abroad – not to mention 9/11 was carried out by Saudi’s. That has to end. Even more disgusting as we learn that Saudi Arabia did not offer to accept one single refugee from Syria - but after Germany and other Western countries accepted to allow thousands to migrate, Saudi Arabia announced to fund the building of 200 mosques for them in Europe. Are you fucking kidding me? I read somewhere Saudi Arabia built over 1,500 mosques worldwide? Any wonder why this religion is a breeding ground for jihadists, fanatics and throwbacks?  It's good to see the German foreign minister express the obvious, it's about fucking time. And more is needed by all Christian nations.

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Germany's vice-chancellor has publicly accused Saudi Arabia of financing terrorists in the West.

Sigmar Gabriel claimed the country was funding mosques linked to extremism, which he said were becoming a threat to public security.

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In an interview with German newspaper, Bild am Sonntag, Mr Gabriel said: “We have to make clear to the Saudis that the time of looking away is over.

“Wahhabi mosques all over the world are financed by Saudi Arabia.

“Many Islamists who are a threat to public safety come from these communities in Germany.”

CHRISTIANITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION

RUSS READ

National Security/Foreign Policy Reporter

dailycaller.com 

About 1.3 million Iraqi Christians have been displaced, murdered or taken prisoner since 2003. A centuries-old civilization now faces permanent extinction while the rest of the world, including the U.S. government, looks on.

As Christians across the world begin to celebrate Christmas, the 300,000 remaining Christians displaced in Iraq and Syria are preparing for a harsh winter that will almost certainly dwindle their numbers further. ISIS has been assaulting Christianity in the Middle East for well over a year and a half, and now the few remaining will be forced to brave the elements in the face of a genocide.

“Assyrian culture is melting,” says Juliana Taimoorazy, head of the Iraqi Christian Relief Council, a group dedicated to aiding Christians being persecuted in the Middle East in an interview with The Daily Caller News Foundation. Taimoorazy ismaking a desperate push to try and raise money to save Assyrian Christians in Iraq before winter settles in. “We want to buy caravans,” says Taimoorazy, referring to the camper-style vehicles that can serve as temporary shelters equipped with running water and electricity.

The Iraqi Christian minority, also known as Assyrian Christians, has a history in the Nineveh Plains region of Iraq going back 6,700 years. Assyrians were one of the first major groups in the region to convert to Christianity and are one of the last groups to speak Aramaic, the language of Jesus Christ.

Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Assyrians numbered 1.6 million in Iraq. With the rise of al-Qaida in Iraq and the Iraqi insurgency, their numbers began to dwindle. In 2014, less than 500,000 remained. In just over a year since its rise, ISIS has slaughtered and displaced the Assyrian Christians with brutal efficiency, cutting their numbers nearly in half to 300,000.

“ISIS took 280 Assyrian hostages to Syria,” says Taimoorazy. Three of the hostages were executed on video in October. This represented the first time ISIS executed Christians on camera, yet Taimoorazy claims the incident went essentially ignored by Western media. ISIS is demanding $100,000 in ransom for each Christian, that’s $28 million to stave off extinction of one of the last remaining Christian groups in the Middle East. Many Assyrians in the diaspora have been successfully resettled in Europe and the United States, including Taimoorazy herself who fled from her native Iran in 1989, however they lack the financial capacity to save their friends and family from the hands of ISIS.

“They [ISIS] know we cannot come up with this kind of money, so they are hoping other groups and countries will come up with the money,” an Assyrian leader told Fox News when the hostages were first taken in April.

Even when the money is raised, the matters regarding ransom are extremely complicated. As a general policy, the United States does not engage directly in hostage negotiations. Assyrians therefore must utilize back-channel sources to secure their loved ones, which usually involves using Sunni Muslim warlords, charity workers and clergy still present in the region. Mar Gewargis III, the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church, is a particularly important figure speaking out on this issue.

There is of course a moral dilemma when Assyrians are forced to pay off ISIS to save their culture: the same ransom money used to save some inevitably fuels the ISIS war machine, allowing the terrorist group to potentially continue its eradication of Christianity in the region.

Assyrian Christianity is facing “a form of soft genocide” in addition to eradication, says Taimoorazy. Even the groups fighting ISIS, like the Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi military, are loathe to aid the Christians. When the first ISIS onslaught hit the Nineveh Plains in the summer of 2014 “the U.S.-backed Iraqi army, wilted before the onslaught, with many soldiers reportedly abandoning their posts and stripping off their uniforms to avoid detection,” says an Al Jazeera report. Taimoorazy claims continued abuse of Christians results when the Kurdish Peshmerga and various Iraqi militias retake towns from ISIS.

Despite witnessing the eradication of Assyrians for over a year, Taimoorazy claims the United States has brought in few of them. She explains that before the ISIS uprising, 45-50 percent of Iraqi refugees coming into the U.S. were Christian, today that number is a remarkable 6 percent, with 89.6 percent of the remaining total being Muslim. When asked why there was such a dramatic drop, Taimoorazy pointed out that while the numbers under Bush were poor, the “[Obama] administration is not friendly to the Christian cause.”

Taimoorazy says those who are fortunate enough to be saved face difficult challenges when resettling. “Assyrian culture is melting,” she claims, due in large part to the poor resettlement policies of Western countries, including the United States. Most Assyrians coming to the United States are spread throughout the country, making it particularly difficult to retain traditional Assyrian customs and their ancient language. “[Assyrians are] assimilating to the Christian community in America,” explains Taimoorazy.

Taimoorazy sees the solution to the Assyrian problem as two-fold. In the short term, better settlement policies will be needed so that Assyrians in the diaspora can continue their traditions and culture abroad. In the long term, she sees the solution as a province dedicated to the Assyrian Christians somewhere in the Nineveh Plains. Taimoorazy and her colleagues see the goal of establishing an Assyrian homeland as a “repackaging of Zionism,” and they already have the support of notable Middle Eastern leader King Abdullah of Jordan. No matter what happens in the future, Taimoorazy makes it evidently clear that if current policy does not change, Christianity in the Middle East could soon be lost to history.

Saudi Arabia Sentences Palestinian Poet To Death For Apostasy

His conviction was based on a witness who claimed to have heard his cursing God, as well as his poems.

Source: Reuters

RIYADH, Nov 20 (Reuters) - A Saudi Arabian court has sentenced a Palestinian poet to death for apostasy, abandoning his Muslim faith, according to trial documents seen by Human Rights Watch, its Middle East researcher Adam Coogle said on Friday. Ashraf Fayadh was detained by the country's religious police in 2013 in Abha, in southwest Saudi Arabia, and then rearrested and tried in early 2014. The verdict of that court sentenced him to four years in prison and 800 lashes but after appeal another judge passed a death sentence on Fayadh three days ago, said Coogle.




"I have read the trial documents from the lower court verdict in 2014 and another one from 17 November. It is very clear he has been sentenced to death for apostasy," Coogle said.
Saudi Arabia's justice system is based on Sharia Islamic law and its judges are clerics from the kingdom's ultra conservative Wahhabi school of Sunni Islam. In the Wahhabi interpretation of Sharia, religious crimes including blasphemy and apostasy incur the death penalty.
In January liberal writer Raif Badawi was flogged 50 times after his sentencing to 10 years in prison and 1,000 lashes for blasphemy last year, prompting an international outcry. Badawi remains in prison, but diplomats say he is unlikely to be flogged again. 
Saudi judges have extensive scope to impose sentences according to their own interpretation of Sharia law without reference to any previous cases. After a case has been heard by lower courts, appeals courts and the supreme court, a convicted defendant can be pardoned by King Salman.
Fayadh's conviction was based on evidence from a prosecution witness who claimed to have heard him cursing God, Islam's Prophet Mohammad and Saudi Arabia, and the contents of a poetry book he had written years earlier.
The case went to the Saudi appeals court and was then returned to the lower court, where a different judge on November 17 increased the sentence to death. The second judge ruled defense witnesses who had challenged the prosecution witness' testimony ineligible.
Saudi Arabia's Justice Ministry or other officials could not immediately be reached for comment.

French sociologist Alain Touraine paper on "The End Of Society"

                                              The End of Society

The main impact of the idea of modernization, in both its positivist and its liberal version, came from its assumption that all social structures and systems of social control are crumbling. Modern societies can no longer be ― 57 ― defined by principles, values, and norms but instead are defined by change, the triumph of instrumental rationality, and the destruction of all absolute principles. Positivists believed that these evolutionary changes would lead to a scientific society governed by political engineers. Liberals predicted that society would be transformed into a market in which all goods and services would be priced according to their utility. But this confidence in reason and change could not exclude a deep-seated anxiety: how would it be possible to introduce order into change, that is, to maintain the unity of society, the continuity of law, and the possibility of education in a society that would be like a stream in whose waters one cannot step twice? Beyond the diversity of its thinkers and schools, sociology is a general interpretation of modern society: its central purpose is to understand the interdependence of order and movement. We must be clear on what classical sociological thought was if we want to understand the importance and the novelty of neomodernist thought, which challenges the solutions that were elaborated by classical sociology during the period of Western industrialization. What we call classical sociology was actually a limited moment in the history of social thought, a moment from which we are probably departing, that was built around the central notion of society. Modernity can be defined as a process of growing differentiation of economic, political, and cultural subsystems. But the concept of society gained a central importance during the long period that corresponded to a limited development of modernity, when economy, politics, and culture were still closely interrelated. In merchant societies, the state was intervening into economic life to protect roads and ports, to check weights and measures, and to ensure the reliability of currencies. European national states eliminated the power of feudal landlords, private wars, and all obstacles to the circulation of people and goods. They imposed the realm of law over their territories. Of course the state was not only a maker of laws and a judge. It was an absolute power and a maker of wars as well. But the idea of the national state and a direct correspondence between a nation and the state gained ground, first in England and France, then in Sweden. Finally, it triumphed with the American and French revolutions and the Rousseauian ideal of the people's sovereignty. Before the Renaissance, social thought was the comparative history of civilizations, that is, religions. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries it became political philosophy. Society meant the polity for Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Tocqueville was more the last of these great political philosophers that the first sociologist. These political philosophers opposed the social to the nonsocial as order to chaos. The idea of the national state as a unifying principle was then, at a ― 58 ― higher level of modernization, replaced by the idea of capitalism, because the central agent of social change was no longer the national state but the bourgeoisie. The concept of capitalism is not a purely economic one because it identifies the economic structure with the process of global change. This identification supposes the existence of strong links between "civil society" and the state, between economy and politics. The idea of society finally appeared as a combination of the national state and capitalism. Thus the idea of society, like the earlier idea of the national state, is an effort to link what the process of modernization tends to separate: economics activity, political and military power, and cultural values. Durkheim among the great classical sociologists has the most anguished awareness of the decomposition of social order and of the necessity to give the idea of society a central role, both in sociological analysis and in the reconstruction of social order. Parsons, in contrast, was more optimistic and gave us a triumphal image of society. He identified society with rationality without sharing Weber's and Durkeim's preoccupation with the consequences of modernization. The idea of society is to a large extent a myth. It tries to overcome the growing separation of the main elements of social life by introducing a central principle of social organization. This sociologism is criticized by those who observe that modern societies are built on power, exploitation. and was as much as on rationality, law, and science. I am not, however, directly interested in these well-known criticisms. My central preoccupation is with the consequences of contemporary hypermodernization, a development that appears to destroy all unifying myths that try to bring together individualistic culture, constantly changing economic activities, and a state that is more and more directly defined by its political, military, and economic competition with other state. The importance of the idea of society is that contemporary hypermodernization appears to destroy it, and it is doing so as rapidly as industrialization destroyed the idea of the national state and led to the notion of society. The main characteristic of contemporary modern society is the extreme separation between the state and social life, a separation that can no longer be overcome by another unifying myth. This separation is felt very intensely in Europe, the continent where the first national states were created. The economies and cultures of European nations have become transnational; their citizens use a higher and higher proportion of foreign products and, even more important, they are subordinated to the nuclear superpowers. The separation between the state and social life was felt less intensely in the United States during the years immediately after World War II, which explains the broad influence of Parsons's sociology. But from the 1960s on, American citizens became conscious of ― 59 ― the separation between state and society. But unlike European countries, their own state had acquired imperial influence, had become a nuclear superpower, and thus could no longer be reduced to a political institution like congress or municipal bodies. At the same time that military power and international strategy are separating themselves more and more from internal policies, mass consumption is overcoming the barriers of social and economic stratification. Although some sociologist maintain oldfashioned ideas in this area, socioeconomic status clearly has decreasing predictive power in explaining consumption patterns and political choices. Often it is more useful to consider upwardly or downwardly mobile groups or ethnic subcultures than socioeconomic strata in explaining social behavior. These observations are sufficient to describe the analysis of those who believe in the waning of social movements. Their central idea is that social movements have existed only inasmuch as they were at the same time political movements. They believe that only action against state power gives unity and a central importance to protest movements, which otherwise tend to be diverse and limited. Peasant movements in seventeenth-century France became important only because they opposed state taxes in addition to the domination of the landlords. If it had not been unified by political action, especially by that of the socialist parties, whose main purpose was not to transform working conditions but to conquer political power, what we call the labor movement would have been only a series of limited protest movements. The predominant role of political action in the labor movements is demonstrated by the fact that socialist parties have played their most important role in countries where unions were relatively weak and where purely political problems were more central than social problems, for example, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and France. The idea of socialism as a global social movements has been more actively developed in these countries than in Great Britain or the United States. This observation leads many to conclude that a social movement is actually a mixture of social protest and political action. This mixture often leads to contradictions, as demonstrated in the Soviet Union during the first years after the revolution. Following the logic of this analysis, if political action and social protest now tend to be more and more separated, social movements must disappear. Liberals, when they go beyond a superficial apology for technological progress and abundance, defend an idea that is as powerful as the ideas of progress and rationalization that were introduced by their predecessors. This idea is the triumph of individualism, that is, the separation between individual needs and aims and state problems. Individualism destroys not only the public space, from institutions to socialization agencies, but also the very possibility of social movements. On one side, liberals ― 60 ― say, we see the presence of individuals, with their sexuality and violence as well as their need for security and their efforts to climb up the social ladder. On the other side is the state, which is first of all a military power and which is often able to absorb social life and manipulate it, as in communist countries, or to identify itself with nationalist and religious forces, as in many Third World countries. Protest movements appear against the state. They range from the dissidents and the refuseniks in the Soviet Unions to the mass movement in the United States opposing the Vietnam war and include movements opposing the permanent threat of nuclear war. But these antistate movements cannot be identified as social movements. This hyperliberal view is highly original and creative. It has been reinforced by the necessity to find a way out of structuralist pessimism. If social domination is complete, if the whole of social organization functions as a system of social control that maintains inequality, privileges, and power, if social movements are impossible and social actors illusory, and if nothing exists but integration, manipulation, expulsion, and stigmatization, then the only possible exit is individualism. This was Barthe's and Foucault's answer at the end of their lives and it is also the "California" answer. It is an aesthetism, the search for pleasure, friendship, and voluntary groups, and it is directly inspired by ancient Greece. According to this view, the real objective of the new social movements is to get rid of society, not to transform it. The new social movements are very far from the social movements that struggled for political freedom and social justice, that is, the social ideas corresponding to the unifying myth of the past. The new social movements recognize as their central value the autonomy of individuals and groups. They try to express this autonomy by withdrawal, sectarian behavior, or terrorism. No longer do social movements seek to control the main cultural resources and models of society through conflicts in which enemies are defined by a process of social domination. This liberal criticism of the so-called new social movements is much more interesting than the vague analysis that lumps various currents of opinions, revolts, social demands, innovations, and antistate campaigns together under this name. The hyperliberal view is far removed from both nineteenth-century optimism and the ideology of classical sociology. This latter body of thought believed in the progressive triumph of civil society over the state and the churches and the parallel development of social and economic integration with social and political movements. This ideology has been particularly strong in the United States, where it is another version of the American dream: the effort to build a society that is at the same time economically dynamic, politically democratic, and socially open to organizational demands and protests. This is why classical sociology was more ― 61 ― influential in the United States that in Europe, especially between the two world wars and during the 1950s. Before I consider the issue of the existence of new social movements, we must recognize as a partial conclusion that the image of a civil society in which opposite and complementary social movements conflict with each other while sharing the same confidence in the idea of progress is an illusion. This illusion, however, is still alive. It was directly present in Italian unionism between 1969 and 1975 and in the ideology of self-management that culminated in the LIP strike in France during this same period. These unionists sought to free their movement from the control of political parties and to create a society dominated by face-toface conflicts and negotiations between management and workers. But we know today—and we should never have forgotten—that the state never can be reduced to the political expression of civil society and cultural demands cannot be identified with programs of social transformation. Culture, society, and state power are more and more separated from each other. The consequence is that no social movement can bear in itself a model of an ideal society. Their actions are limited. Either the cultural and political unity of the national society is strong, which limits social conflicts and movements, as has generally been the case in the past, or this unity is weak or absent and nothing can integrate cultural demands, which are more and more individualized. The history of modernization is not the victory of the market and economic actors over states and churches but the decomposition of community, the growing separation of state economic activity, and personality problems. At the end of the decomposition of "society," defined as interrelated economic, cultural, and political systems that are integrated by institutions and socialization processes, it seems logical to announce the end of social movements, which are destroyed by the double triumph of individualism and state power and can no longer transform a society that has disappeared. If we consider not only the most industrialized countries but also the rest of the world, the most important collective movements today are not social movements, such as socialism, communism, or unionism, which have been largely transformed into the ideological bases of state power, but rather the Islamic movement and, more broadly, the movements calling for identity, specificity and community that link cultural demands and state power and suppress, generally in a violent way, public space and social movements. The world appears divided into two parts: Western countries that are dynamic, individualistic, anomic, and deprived or freed from collective action, and Third World countries that are dominated by cultural or even religious nationalism. In between these two parts the communist world crushes both individual demands and collective ― 62 ― action; its use of the vocabulary of the labor movement only emphasizes communism's destruction. In such a situation, is it not logical to consider that social movements take place only in historical settings in which principles of social integration and open social conflicts coexist? Without a principle of social integration based on a legitimate state, no central social movement can be created; without open social conflicts and a recognized plurality of interests, social movements are reduced to rebellions. Social movements were, according to this view, directly linked with societies integrated by unifying myths—of the national state or society—as well as with autonomous economics relations. We now observe their decomposition in countries where an absolute state tolerates no diversity and imposes its rule in the name of a communitarian destiny. 

October death toll and casualty numbers are in

Health Ministry: 80 Palestinians, Including 17 Children And 4 Women, Killed Since October 1st

by IMEMC News 

The Palestinian Health Ministry reported Sunday that the number of Palestinians killed by the Israeli army and armed Israeli paramilitary settlers in the period between October 1 and the evening of Sunday evening November 8, has reached 80, including 17 children and 4 women, while more than 3000 Palestinians have been injured.

The Ministry said 60 Palestinians have been killed in the occupied West Bank, and 18, including a mother and her child, have been killed in the Gaza Strip, and one in the Negev.

On Sunday, the soldiers shot and killed a young Palestinian man identified as Salman Aqel Mohammad Shahin, 22allegedly after ramming four Israeli settlers with his car, near the Za’tara roadblock, south of the northern West Bank city of Nablus.

The Health Ministry stated that 1248 Palestinians have been shot with live army rounds in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and 1808 have been shot with rubber-coated steel bullets; 1008 of them required hospitalization and 800 received treatment by field medics.

In the West Bank, 826 Palestinians were shot with live rounds, 895 with rubber-coated steel bullets, while in the Gaza Strip, 422 were shot with live rounds, and 113 with rubber-coated steel bullets.

The Ministry also said that 247 Palestinians suffered fractures and bruises after being assaulted by Israeli soldiers and paramilitary settlers, and 24 suffered burns due to Israeli gas bombs and concussion grenades.

Among the wounded Palestinians in the West Bank are 370 children; 180 shot with live Israeli army fire, 120 with rubber-coated steel bullets, 30 were directly shot with gas bombs and concussion grenades, and 40 were beaten by soldiers and settlers. 170 children have been injured in the Gaza Strip, most of them with live army fire.

List of those killed since October 1st:

West Bank and Jerusalem:

1. Mohannad Halabi, 19, al-Biereh – Ramallah. Shot after allegedly grabbing gun and killing two Israelis. 10/3
2. Fadi Alloun, 19, Jerusalem. Israeli claim of 'attack' contradicted by eyewitnesses and video. 10/4
3. Amjad Hatem al-Jundi, 17, Hebron.
4. Thaer Abu Ghazala, 19, Jerusalem.
5. Abdul-Rahma Obeidallah, 11, Bethlehem.
6. Hotheifa Suleiman, 18, Tulkarem.
7. Wisam Jamal Faraj, 20, Jerusalem. Shot by an exploding bullet during protest. 10/8
8. Mohammad al-Ja’bari, 19, Hebron.
9. Ahmad Jamal Salah, 20, Jerusalem.
10. Ishaq Badran, 19, Jerusalem. Israeli claim of 'attack' contradicted by eyewitnesses. 10/10
11. Mohammad Said Ali, 19, Jerusalem.
12. Ibrahim Ahmad Mustafa Awad, 28, Hebron. Shot at protest by rubber-coated steel bullet in his forehead. 10/11
13. Ahmad Abdullah Sharaka, 13, Al Jalazoun Refugee camp-Ramallah.
14. Mostafa Al Khateeb, 18, Sur-Baher – Jerusalem.
15. Hassan Khalid Manassra, 15, Jerusalem.
16. Mohammad Nathmie Shamasna, 22, Qotna - Jerusalem. Allegedly grabbed gun of Israeli soldier on bus and killed two. 10/13
17. Baha’ Elian, 22, Jabal Al Mokaber-Jerusalem.
18. Mutaz Ibrahim Zawahra, 27, Bethlehem. Hit with a live bullet in the chest during a demonstration.
19. Ala’ Abu Jammal, 33, Jerusalem.
20. Bassem Bassam Sidr, 17, Hebron. Killed in Jerusalem after Israeli shoted that he 'had a knife' - but no knife was present.
21. Ahmad Abu Sh’aban, 23, Jerusalem.
22. Riyadh Ibraheem Dar-Yousif, 46, Al Janyia village Ramallah( Killed while harvesting olives)
23. Fadi Al-Darbi , 30, Jenin – died in Israeli detention camp.
24. Eyad Khalil Al Awawdah, Hebron.
25. Ihab Hannani, 19, Nablus.
26. Fadel al-Qawasmi, 18, Hebron. Shot by paramilitary settler, Israeli soldier caught on film planting knife near his body.
27. Mo'taz Ahmad 'Oweisat, 16, Jerusalem. Military claimed he 'had a knife'. 10/17
28. Bayan Abdul-Wahab al-'Oseyli, 16, Hebron. Military claimed she 'had a knife', but video evidence contradicts that claim. 10/17
29. Tariq Ziad an-Natsha, 22, Hebron. 10/17
30. Omar Mohammad al-Faqeeh, 22, Qalandia. Military claimed he 'had a knife'. 10/17
31. Mohannad al-‘Oqabi, 21, Negev. Allegedly killed soldier in bus station in Beer Sheba.
32. Hoda Mohammad Darweesh, 65, Jerusalem.
33. Hamza Mousa Al Amllah, 25, from Hebron, killed near Gush Etzion settlement.
34. Odai Hashem al-Masalma, 24, Beit 'Awwa town near Hebron.
35. Hussam Isma’el Al Ja’bari, 18, Hebron.
36. Bashaar Nidal Al Ja’bari, 15, Hebron.
37. Hashem al-'Azza, 54, Hebron.
38. Moa’taz Attalah Qassem, 22, Eezariyya town near Jerusalem. 10/21
39. Mahmoud Khalid Eghneimat, 20, Hebron.
40. Ahmad Mohammad Said Kamil, Jenin.
41. Dania Jihad Irshied, 17, Hebron.
42. Sa’id Mohamed Yousif Al-Atrash, 20, Hebron.
43. Raed Sakit Abed Al Raheem Thalji Jaradat, 22, Sa’er – Hebron.
44. Eyad Rouhi Ihjazi Jaradat, 19, Sa’er – Hebron.
45. Ezzeddin Nadi Sha'ban Abu Shakhdam, 17, Hebron.Shot by Israeli military after allegedly wounding soldier, then left to bleed to death.
46. Shadi Nabil Dweik, 22, Hebron. Shot by Israeli military after allegedly wounding the same soldier, then left to bleed to death.
47. Homam Adnan Sa’id, 23, Tal Romeida, Hebron. Shot by Israeli soldiers claiming 'he had a knife', but eyewitnesses report seeing soldiers throwing a knife next to his dead body. 10/27
48. Islam Rafiq Obeid, 23, Tal Romeida, Hebron. 10/28
49. Nadim Eshqeirat, 52, Jerusalem. 10/29 - Died when Israeli soldiers delayed his ambulance.
50. Mahdi Mohammad Ramadan al-Mohtasib, 23, Hebron. 10/29
51. Farouq Abdul-Qader Seder, 19, Hebron. 10/29
52. Qassem Saba’na, 20, shot on motorcycle near Zaatara checkpoint. 10/30
53. Ahmad Hamada Qneibi, 23, Jerusalem. Soldiers claimed 'he had a knife'.
54. Ramadan Mohammad Faisal Thawabta, 8 month old baby, Bethlehem. Died of tear gas inhalation.
55. Mahmoud Talal Abdul-Karim Nazzal, 18, al-Jalama checkpoint near Jenin. Israeli troops claim 'he had a knife', but eyewitnesses contradict that claim. 10/31
56. Fadi Hassan al-Froukh, 27. Beit Einoun, east of Hebron. 11/1.
57. Ahmad Awad Abu ar-Rob, 16, Jenin.
58. Samir Ibrahim Skafi, 23, Hebron. Shot by Israeli soldiers after his car hit a soldier who was on the street - it is unknown if he hit the soldier intentionally or accidentally. 11/4 59. Malek Talal Sharif, 25, Hebron, shot dead after the army claimed he attempted to stab a settler. 11/5 60.Tharwat Ibrahim Salman Sha’rawi, 73, shot dead by the army in Hebron.
61. Salman Aqel Mohammad Shahin, 22, Nablus.
62. Rasha Ahmad Hamed 'Oweissi, 24. Qalqilia. Carried suicide note and knife, but did not attempt to attack anyone.

Gaza Strip:

63. Shadi Hussam Doula, 20.
64. Ahmad Abdul-Rahman al-Harbawi, 20.
65. Abed al-Wahidi, 20.
66. Mohammad Hisham al-Roqab, 15.
67. Adnan Mousa Abu ‘Oleyyan, 22.
68. Ziad Nabil Sharaf, 20.
69. Jihad al-‘Obeid, 22.
70. Marwan Hisham Barbakh, 13.
71. Khalil Omar Othman, 15.
72. Nour Rasmie Hassan, 30. Killed along with her child in an Israeli airstrike. 10/11
73. Rahaf Yahya Hassan, two years old. Killed along with her mother in an Israeli airstrike. 10/11
74. Yahya Abdel-Qader Farahat, 23.
75. Shawqie Jamal Jaber Obeid, 37.
76. Mahmoud Hatem Hameeda, 22. Northern Gaza. 77. Ahmad al-Sarhi, 27, al-Boreij.
78. Yihya Hashem Kreira.
79. Khalil Hassan Abu Obeid, 25. Khan Younis. Died from wounds sustained in protest earlier in the week.
80. Salama Mousa Abu Jame’, 23, Khan Younis.

Non-Palestinian killed by Israeli mob:
Eritrean asylum-seeker Haftom Zarhum killed in Beer Sheva bus station by angry mob who mistook him for a Palestinian- 10/18

Names of known Israeli casualties during the same time period:

1 & 2. 10/1 - Eitam and Na’ama Henkin, both aged around 30 years old, killed in drive-by shooting near Itamar settlement.
3. 10/3 - Nahmia Lavi, 41 - Rabbi for Israeli military. Killed in Jerusalem stabbing attack near Lion's Gate when he tried to shoot the attacker but had his weapon taken.
4. 10/3 - Aaron Bennet, 24. Killed in Jerusalem stabbing attack near Lion's Gate.
5. 10/13 - Yeshayahu Kirshavski, 60, bus shooting in East Jerusalem
6. 10/13 - Haviv Haim, 78, bus shooting in East Jerusalem
7. 10/13 - Richard Lakin, 76, bus shooting in East Jerusalem (died of wounds several days after the attack)
8. 10/18 - Omri Levy, 19, Israeli soldier with the Golani Brigade who had his weapon grabbed and turned against him by an Israeli resident.

An additional 2 Israelis that were initially claimed to have been killed in attacks were actually killed in car accidents.

[source: http://www.imemc.org/article/73804]

Palestinian gets shot attempting to stab Israeli

No excuse for this kind of madness. Taking a knife to a gunfight is the definition of insanity. Palestinian leadership should stop incitement and stop sending these people on suicide missions. Their cause is just but acts like these do nothing to advance it. In fact, it has the apposite  effect, only serves the interest of fanatics on both sides - Arabs and Jewish.  It is disgusting that Palestinian leadership has nothing to offer it's tormented and oppressed people than more suicidal acts of desperation. They need to be proactive in shaping the struggle against the occupation. It MUST be non-violent. It must include all segment of Palestinian society to take part in the non-violent struggle for independence or equal rights within Israel. Otherwise, these "lone wolf" incidents are nothing more than acts of insanity.